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THE LIQUIDITY POSITION OF
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,
WORLD WAR I
A SHORT DISCUSSION OF THE LIQUIDITY position of our sample
of large manufacturing corporations during the years of World
War I will serve as a useful background for an analysis of cash
balances in World 'War II. The war years 1915-18 were years
of sharp business expansion. As in other periods of expansion,
operating assets were increased, an increase that was financed by
retained profits, new issues of stocks, trade credits, and new
bank loans.
The question of primary interest in our analysis is whether
or not companies increased their cash balances relative to their
payments. As the managements of many corporations had to
anticipate a conversion to peacetime production when the war
was over, they might have built up a strong liquidity position
during the war in order to be prepared for the contingency.
Corporations prepare for such contingencies partly by setting
up special reserves. During the first World War they did this
oniy to a small extent;1 in fact, in our particular samples of large
manufacturing corporations only one corporation had a special
reserve for postwar contingencies.Probably special appropria-
tions for contingency reserves were provided in quite a large
number of cases, but taken altogether the amount of these ap-
propriations was relatively small. At any rate, the mere setting
up of a reserve on the corporation's books does nothing to make
the corporationmore liquid. The liquidity position depends on
the compositio,n of assets, and only if the setting up of reserves is
associated with a deliberate increase of liquid assets can it be
said to increase the corporation's liquidity. The income set aside
1SeeCharles H. Schmidt and Ralph A. Young, The Effect of War on Btuineu
Financing: Manufacturing and World War I (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Financial Research Program, 1943).
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as special reserves may go to swell the corporation's inventories,
receivables, or fixed equipment instead of increasingits cash
balance or marketable securities. The liquidity position therefore
has to be investigated by analyzing not the special reserves set
up during the war but the liquid assets in relation either to pay-
ments or current liabilities.
A first glance at the cash balance figures alone gives the im-
pression that the liquidity of corporations increased greatly during
the war years, since cash in 1918 was some two and a half times
higher than in 1914. This impression is strengthened if the in-
crease in cash balances of our sample of large manufacturing
corporations is related to the increase in total means of payment.
As Table 1 shows, the percentage increase in cash balances was
Table 1—INDEXES OF CASH BALANCES OF LARGE MANU-





TotalMeans ofPaymentb Sample Aa Sample Ca
1914 100 100 100
1915 135 135 110
1916 192 210 127
1917 237 251 141
1918 248 265 159
1919 . 245 262 183
1920 221 234 189
1921 215 209 188
a For a description of the sample see Appendix A.
b Includes demand and time deposits, excluding government deposits, of all banks
(including savings banks) plus currency in circulation outside banks. Data from
Banking and Monetary Statistics(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1943) p. 34.
greaterthan the percentage increase in total means of payment;
in other words, the large corporations increased their share in
total means of payment during the first World War.
This impression of an increased cash liquidity during World
Wlar I is misleading, however.If liquidity is measured by the
ratio of cash to payments, the liquidity of corporations is found
to have decreased. The ratio, after rising between 1915 and 1917,
(dl in 1918 to a level lower in 1915.(See Table 2.) NoLiquidity Position, World War 1 69
Table 2—LIQUIDITY POSITION OF SAMPLE C OF LARGE
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1915-22 a














1915 $169 $56 $2,303 7.3% 9.8%
1916 249 127 3,397 7.3 11.1
1917 332 259 4,423 7.5 13.4
1918 372 388 5,893 6.3 12.9
1919 380 350 6,113 6.2 11.9
1920 358 262 6,088 5.9 10.2
1921 319 245 4,142 7.7 13.6
1922 315 242 4,191 7.5 13.3
a For a description of the sample see Appendix A.
b Average of two successive year-end figures.
CRatioof average cash of two successive year ends to total payments in the year
between the two dates.
dRatio of average cash plus average marketable securities of two successive year
ends to total payments in the year between the two dates.
"free" cash existed at the end of the war, whether the situation
in 1918 is compared with that of the beginning of the war or with
that during the expansion of the twenties. It must be pointed out
that, in spite of the fact that their cash position in 1918 was not
very favorable, corporations in the expansion immediately follow-
ing the war drew on their cash balances with the result that in
1920 the ratio of cash to payments was the lowest in the entire
period, 1915-43.
As for marketable securities, the point to be stressed first is
that World War I is responsible for the corporations' now well-
established custom of holding marketable securities. At the close
of 1914 such holdings of corporations were negligible, but under
the impact of the various war loan drives the figure rose greatly.
By the end of 1918 our sample of large manufacturing corpora-
tions (sample C) held more than twenty times the amount of
securities which they held four years earlier. There is no doubt
that this increase in marketable securities made possible the decline
in cash liquidity. Since marketable securities are a close substitute
for cash, the companies could lower their cash liquidity as they70 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43
increased their holdings of securities.Objection may be raised
to the contention that marketable securities are as good as cash,
on the ground that a sudden rush to liquidate them would cause a
sharp fall in their prices. There is some truth in this objection
for the period under consideration. When the corporations ac-
tually did liquidate a large part of their holdings of marketable
securities in 1919 prices began to break, particularly since com-
mercial banks were not prepared to take over securities in large
volume.Nevertheless, the corporations considered that their
holdings of marketables added to their liquidity, even though in
many cases they had to sell them at a loss.
The ratio of cash plus marketable securities to payments in
1918 was actually higher than at the beginning of the war 12.9
percent in 1918 compared with 9.8 percent in 1915 (Table 2).
In the postwar boom, corporations were able to draw on their
marketable securities, with the result that by 1920 the ratio of
cash plus marketable securities to payments declined to10.2
percent. The funds obtained through sales of marketable securi-
ties apparently were used to discharge tax liabilities.2
The fact that marketable securities plus cash constituted a
higher percentage of total payments in 1918 than in 1915 does
not permit the conclusion that there was a conscious policy on
the part of corporations to build up excess liquidity. If the ratios
commonly in use for measuring the liquidity of an industrial com-
pany (see Chart 17)are considered, they are found to have
been lower in 1918 than in previous years. The sharp decline in
the ratios between 1916,and 1918 seems to indicate the absence
of any conscious effort to build up a special liquidity for the pur-
pose of postwar contingencies. Nor is the building up of such
special liquidity necessary as long as the corporations can rely on
obtaining bank credit. The inventory boom of 1919 and the first
half of 1920 was indeed financed overwhelmingly by bank loans,
and not by drawing on liquid funds built up during the war.
For medium-sized and small manufacturing corporations (for
2Thedecrease in current liabilities in 1919 wasgreaterthan the decline of market-
able securities. A closer investigation shows that the item "other current liabilities"
was responsible for the decline of total current liabilities. Since tax liabilities are the
main part of "other current liabilities," we can conclude that the funds obtained by
sales of government bonds were used to reduce the tax liabilities.Notes payable
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which figures are available only since the end of 1916) the cash
liquidity shows no appreciable change over the last two years of
World War I. The cash balance of this group of companies at
the end of 1918 was 27.4 percent above that at the close of 1916.
Since payments increased only slightly more than average cash,
the ratio of cash to payments in 1918 was approximately the
same as in 1917 (2.6 percent as against 2.7 percent). However,
the medium and small corporations apparently were heavy buyers
of marketable securities; the item which includes
these securities multiplied 3y'2 times between the end of 1916
and the end of 1918 and continued to increase through 1920. The
increase during the war years must have consisted to a large
extent of government securities bought during the war loan
drives. The fact that "investments" decreased sharply in 1921,
the year of business contraction, also suggests that this group of
corporations had made heavy purchases of marketable securities
during the war period. As a result of these purchases the liquidity
position of this group seems to have improved in 1918 compared
with 1917. The ratio of average cash plus "investments" to pay-
ments was 8.7 percent in 1918, as against 6.5 percent in 1917.
Although only part of "investments" can be considered as liquid
funds, the figure indicates the direction in which the liquidity of
medium-sized and small manufacturing corporations moved in
the late years of World War J•3
SUMMARY
(1) Neither large nor medium-sized and small manufacturing corporations
built up a special cashliquidityduring 'World 'War I.
(2) The ratio of cash plus marketable securities to payments for large
manufacturing corporations was higher at the end of World War I
than at the beginning, indicating that a certain amount of "free" liquid
funds were available at the close of the war. Medium-sized and small
manufacturing corporations also possessed such free funds.
(3) These funds were used by large manufacturing corporations mainly to
discharge tax liabilities. The inventory boom that set in after the war
was financed not by drawing on free liquid funds but by bank credit.
3Theavailable material does not separate trade payables and bank debts for this
group of corporations. It is therefore not possible to tell to what extent this group of
corporations had to rely on bank credit for the financing of the postwar inventory
boom.